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ABSTRACT Economic analysis of optimal ecosystem management in the presence
of a threshold has typically ignored the potential for induced behavioral responses. This
paper contributes to the literature on non-convex ecosystem management by considering
the implications of a particular behavioral response in a regional economy - that of amenity-
led growth - to changes in ecosystem services generated by a lake ecosystem subject to a
eutrophication threshold. The essential policy challenge is to achieve optimal levels of lake
nutrients and urbanization given that improvements to water quality will induce additional
migration and urbanization in the region with attendant ecological impacts. We show that
policies that ignore the recursive relationship between urbanization and water quality un-
intentionally exacerbate boom-bust cycles of regional growth and decline and risk pushing
the system towards long-run economic decline. In contrast, the optimal policy accounts for
the behavioral feedbacks to improved ecosystem services, and balances regional growth and
ecological degradation.
KEYWORDS: ecosystem management, non-convex dynamics, dynamic optimization,
safe minimum standard, resilience
ii1. Introduction
Ecological thresholds are critical points at which small changes in one or more system
parameters or variables produce large responses in the ecosystem state or function [21].
Examples include sudden shifts in ecosystem states from clear to turbid water or from
grassland to shrubland. Ecologists and economists have long hypothesized that these abrupt
changes arise from systems characterized by multiple stable states [3, 22, 28] and conditions
that, given a small change, push the system from the domain of one stable state into another.
Such systems are viewed as having more or less resilience to external perturbations depending
on their relative ”distance” from a threshold or domain boundary. The ecological damages
and potential irreversibility associated with breeching a threshold have led economists to
consider optimal strategies for managing systems subject to threshold dynamics. However,
until recently, the complexity of these ecological dynamics and the potential for policy to
induce individual behavioral responses that generate feedbacks to the ecosystem have been
ignored in the derivation of an optimal dynamic policy. In many cases human activities
are a major determinant of ecological thresholds and thus policies that improve ecosystem
services without addressing potential behavioral feedbacks are likely to be ineﬃcient and
may unintentionally degrade ecosystem services and reduce ecosystem resilience.
In this paper, we develop a simple model of a regional economy with a lake ecosystem
and consider the role of a speciﬁc behavioral feedback: amenity-led growth that responds to
changes in water quality. The lake ecosystem in this paper is subject to threshold dynamics
in which nutrient loadings generated by human activities, including urbanization, can cause a
shift from an oligotrophic to eutrophic lake state, which drastically reduces water quality [8].
The essential policy challenge is to achieve optimal levels of lake nutrients and urbanization
given that improvements to water quality will induce additional migration and urbanization
in the region with attendant ecological impacts. Because uncoordinated individual activities
are simultaneously aﬀecting and responding to ecological changes, the policy maker cannot
fully control the polluting activities simply by controlling nutrient loadings. We show that
policies that ignore this recursive relationship can result in pushing the lake ecosystem closer
1to its threshold than is optimal. In contrast, the optimal policy, which accounts for both
the impacts of urbanization and the migration response to changes in ecosystem services,
permits ecological degradation, but avoids overdevelopment that pushes the system across
the threshold by maintaining some level of resilience. These results echo the observations of
Smith [29] in the context of managed ﬁsheries: “what is biologically safe cannot meaningfully
be determined without accounting for the behavioral responses”.
2. Literature Review
Economic studies of ecological threshold management have developed along two lines
that are distinguished by how the ecological dynamics and economic-ecological interactions
are modeled. One approach focuses on the appropriate economic decisions in the face of
ecological thresholds, but greatly simpliﬁes the ecological dynamics by assuming that eco-
logical thresholds are exogenously determined discrete changes in the stock of natural re-
sources. Ciracy-Wantrup [11] took this approach, for example, in proposing the need for safe
minimum standards that ensure some amount of ecological preservation. The underlying
assumption is that ecosystem functioning is dependent on maintaining ecological resources
above a threshold level and that the net beneﬁts of doing so outweigh the costs of breaching
this threshold. Others have assumed the same type of exogenous threshold, but focused
on the economic eﬃciency of dynamic policies that either do or don’t permit the threshold
to be breached. In the discussion of the optimal management of nonrenewable resources,
Cropper [14] and Dasgupta and Heal [15] show that breaching the threshold, i.e., depleting
the natural resource within a ﬁnite time, could be an optimal strategy either with or with-
out substitutes for the ecological resource. Farzin [19] treats the ecological threshold as the
critical stock of pollution at which the environmental damage jumps discretely from zero.
He shows that when the threshold level is known with certainty, the optimal policy is to
let the pollution stock gradually accumulate to the threshold level. When the location of
threshold is a priori unknown, the optimal policy will create a continuum of equilibria so as
to provide a buﬀer zone against breaching the threshold [31, 32]. Naevdal and Oppenheimer
[26] extends the analysis to the case of multiple thresholds with unknown locations.
2The other line of research on the optimal management of ecological thresholds, as pi-
oneered by Carpenter, Brock and their coauthors [5, 8, 13, 16], explicitly considers the
complex and nonlinear ecological dynamics that underlie ecological thresholds, which can
give rise to various types of multiple equilibria [5]. Carpenter, Ludwig and Brock [8] model
optimal lake management that is subject to nonlinear eutrophication. The social planner is
assumed to have direct control over phosphorus loadings that lead to lake eutrophication.
When the lake system allows open access by multiple polluters, M¨ aler [23] ﬁnds the similar
over-exploitation result as in the tragedy of commons. Brock and Xepapadeas [6] consider
the spatial spill-over eﬀect driven by the diﬀusion process of phosphorus in the lake and
show that under the optimal ecological management policy, a perturbation in phosphorus
loadings can potentially ﬂip the lake from oligotrophic state to eutrophic state and gener-
ate spatially heterogeneous steady state patterns. Dasgupta and M¨ aler [16] and Mitra and
Roy [25] synthesize the literature by emphasizing the importance of threshold dynamics in
economic analysis. The central contribution of these papers has been to provide policy anal-
ysis of a more complex ecological system that includes some interaction with the economy.
However, they do not consider individual-level economic decisions and implicitly assume
the policy maker has a full control over the economic activities that degrade the ecology.
For example, the lake management models [5, 8, 16] assume that policy makers have direct
control over phosphorus loadings whereas in reality, policy makers can only indirectly in-
ﬂuence nonpoint source pollution of farmers, land developers and others whose individual
actions generate these loadings. Such an approach overlooks the potential that individual
behavioral responses to policy can inﬂuence the outcome of the policy.
A long tradition of analyzing thresholds exists in the ﬁsheries literature beginning with
Clark’s critical depensation model in which production is assumed to be an S-shaped func-
tion. However, like [5, 8, 12], the social planner’s optimal dynamic policy problem has not
included consideration of policy-induced behavioral responses. Instead the focus has been
largely on the implications of uncertainty regarding the location of the threshold. Alvarez
[2], for example, investigates the optimal harvesting policy under stochastic ﬂuctuations.
He ﬁnds that the presence of critical depensation introduces a lower harvesting threshold
3below which the population should be immediately depleted because the expected net pop-
ulation growth rate is non-positive. Woodward and Shaw [36] study the optimal water
allocation when instream ﬂows aﬀect ﬁsh population. Employing robust control, they show
that ambiguity averse strategy can be less cautious in terms of protecting the species.
Dynamic optimal policy analysis that incorporates individual responses is clearly dif-
ﬁcult because of the endogenous feedbacks implied by these individual responses and the
technical diﬃculty in accounting for these feedbacks in deriving the optimal policy solution.
In setting the optimal dynamic policy, the policy maker must consider not only the ecologi-
cal dynamics, but also anticipate the individual responses to the policy and the cumulative
eﬀects of these responses on ecological dynamics. A few articles incorporated individual
responses. For instance, Chen, Irwin and Jayaprakash [9] explicitly model individual eco-
nomic behavior and their two-way interactions with ecological threshold dynamics. Smith et
al. [30] developes a dynamic ﬁsheries model with recursive economic-ecological interactions
and a critical depensation point. Eichner and Pethig and their coauthors [10, 18] propose
a theoretical framework that incorporate individual decisions and ecological details. To the
best of our knowledge, no one has addressed the question of optimal dynamic policy with
both an ecological threshold and recursive economic-ecological interactions that arise from
individual behavioral responses to policy-driven improvements in the ecosystem.
3. A Coupled Economic-Ecological System
We begin with a dynamic model that is a general abstraction of a coupled economic-
ecological system and incorporate an ecological threshold triggered by uncoordinated in-
dividual economic activities. The interactions between the individual activities and the
ecosystem are coupled in that individuals both aﬀect and respond to ecological changes.
When the stock of pollutants is low, the ecological system is able to absorb and biodegrade
the pollutants. However, when the stock of pollutants becomes too high, an internal positive
feedback mechanism is triggered that exceeds the absorption capacity of the system. The
economic system aﬀects and responds to ecological changes through optimal individual de-
cisions regarding location and consumption. Individuals’ location decisions are determined
4in part by the quality of ecosystem amenities in a region, which are in turn aﬀected by
the number of people living in the region and their urban land consumption. Thus a well-
functioning (malfunctioning) ecological system will accelerate (hinder) economic growth due
to amenity-led growth. We use the lake ecosystem as our stylized ecological system because
of the generality of the threshold speciﬁcation [16].
3.1. Dynamics of Lake Water Quality and the Eutrophication Threshold
Following [8], our measure of lake water quality is reduced to a measure of total phospho-
rus concentration in the lake water under the assumption that phosphorus is the limiting
factor in the lake eutrophication process. Phosphorus concentration increases with phos-
phorus loadings, decreases with outﬂow and sedimentation and is aﬀected by phosphorus
recycling. Because the phosphorus loadings are mainly determined by land uses around the
lake, we assume that phosphorus loadings are proportional to the total area of urban land
use in the region. The recycling term is assumed to be S-shaped, which is a mathemati-
cal simpliﬁcation for the complicated bio-physical and ecological dynamics underlying the
observed eutrophication threshold. When the phosphorus concentration level is low, this
recycling term is insigniﬁcant. In this state of the lake, referred to as the oligotrophic state,
the nutrient concentration level is relatively low in the water column, water is relatively
clear and the ecosystem services are healthy. When phosphorus concentration goes beyond
the eutrophication threshold, the over-enrichment of phosphorus will trigger a nonlinear re-
sponse in the ecological dynamics that leads to a eutrophic state of the lake which typically
associates with turbid water, high algae concentration and frequent ﬁsh kills. The over-
enrichment in phosphorus due to excessive pollutant loadings triggers this so-called regime
shift from the oligotrophic state to the eutrophic state. Once such a regime shift has oc-
curred, reductions in loadings cannot guarantee an immediate reverse of the lake back into
the oligotrophic state and thus the ecological dynamics exhibit hysteresis. When a recovery
does occur, it may take a long time. For example, after the Cuyahoga River ﬁre in 1969,
substantial reductions in point sources around Lake Erie failed to bring about meaningful
improvements in water quality until ten years after the controls had been implemented.
5The dynamics of lake water quality is governed by an equation adapted from [8]:
˙ P(t) = l0 + l1 L(t)   sP(t) + r1
P(t)r2
P(t)r2 + p
r2
c
: (1)
Here, P(t) is the phosphorus concentration in the lake water at time t and ˙ P is its change
rate. The loadings consist of a constant l0 and the total loadings from the residential land
use l1 L(t). l1 captures the average impact of land use on lake water quality. L(t) gives the
total developed land in the region. The phosphorus outﬂow is captured in sP(t), where s
denotes the proportional rate of P-loss from the system. It accounts for both sedimentation
and outﬂow, which remove P from the water column. The last term represents phosphorus
recycling. In shallow lakes, phosphorus at the bottom of the lake can be re-suspended back
into lake water. In stratiﬁed lakes, recycling depends on oxygen depletion in the hypolimnion
during the stratiﬁed season [8]. Recycling occurs only when the phosphorus concentration
is suﬃciently high. The maximum rate of recycling is r1 and the steepness of the recycling
curve is governed by r2. pc is the P value at which recycling reaches half its maximum
rate. The recycling term that gives rise to threshold responses is a general feature of many
ecosystems [5]. Therefore, with appropriate modiﬁcations, the analysis presented in this
paper is also applicable to more generic economic-ecological systems.
3.2. Migration and Regional Economy
The dynamics of the regional economy are driven by households’ migration decisions is
adapted from [9]. Households make decisions to migrate to the region by comparing the
reservation utility u0 that they receive from outside the region with the utility that they
would receive from living in the region. Households that live in the region supply labor to
produce the numeraire good X according to the production function: X = E(N)F(N). N
stands for regional population. F(N) is a standard neoclassical production function. E(N),
according to Fujita and Thisse [20], captures agglomeration through scale eﬀects that are
external to individual ﬁrms. As we discuss below, this is a simpliﬁcation that is nonetheless
consistent with the empirical literature on this type of production externality. Assuming
that regional output market is perfectly competitive, then the local wage rate is determined
6by
W = E(N)F
′(N): (2)
Given the wage income, households maximize utility by consuming the composite good
(Xi) and land (Li), where the subscript i indicates individual consumption. The household
optimization problem given the regional population (N) and ecological condition (P) is:
U(N; P; W; R) = max
Xi;Li
{
X
cx
i L
1−cx
i + Uc(N) + Ue(P)
}
(3)
subject to Xi + R  Li = W, where cx is the consumption elasticity of the numeraire good
with a normalized price of 1; R is the land rent; Uc is the disutility from congestion; Ue is the
utility from enjoying the natural amenities; and P is the phosphorus concentration in the
lake. The household’s optimal consumption is given by Xi = cx W and Li = (1   cx)W=R.
We assume that the supply of residential land is perfectly elastic given the abundance
of homogeneous land in the region. In other words, residential land is supplied at constant
price (r0),1 which is the sum of the opportunity cost of land, as measured by agricultural
returns, and the construction cost of a housing unit. At the land market equilibrium, R = r0.
Substituting the individual consumption of Xi and Li along with the market clearing
conditions into the individual utility function, we arrive at the the indirect utility of the
household that lives in the region, which is conditional on N and P:
U
∗(
N(t);P(t)
)
= U
(
N(t); P(t); W = W(N(t)); R = r0
)
(4)
Assuming that the migration rate is proportional to the utility diﬀerence between migrat-
ing versus not migrating into the region, we can specify the dynamic equation that relates
migration and regional economy as:
˙ N = U
∗(N;P)   u0; (5)
1This assumption ignores the possibility that construction costs may be endogenously determined in
the region. Accounting for this endogeneity is quite involving. While we have not fully incorporated this
endogeneity into our model, we explore the sensitivity of the model to this assumption in section 6 by
investigating its potential impact on regional development and ecological conditions.
7where ˙ N stands for the migration rate. Other things equal, when the reservation utility u0
is high, stronger agglomeration forces or preference for natural amenities are necessary to
maintain the rigor of the regional economy. The argument t is suppressed from here on.
3.3. Dynamics of the Coupled Economic-Ecological System
The dynamics of this coupled economic-ecological system is governed by equations (1)
and (5). The dynamic equation for the regional economy is hump shaped in the local popu-
lation, which reﬂects a generic feature in regional development models. That is, at the initial
stages of development, the in-migration rate increases with population as a consequence of
agglomeration. However, as population increases, the congestion eﬀect will eventually dom-
inate and the migration rate will slow down. The inverse relationship between the migration
rate and the ecological variable P reﬂects people’s preference for high quality natural ameni-
ties. The changes in the ecological system are aﬀected by human land use decisions and the
nonlinear threshold dynamics captured in the recycling term that arise when phosphorus
concentrations are suﬃciently high. This recycling term generates the ecological threshold
that is the essence of the policy challenge and at the same time makes the optimization
problem analytically intractable. For this reason, we use numerical methods to solve the
optimal policy. The model is parameterized using secondary data and estimates from the lit-
erature. Because of the potential sensitivity of our results to the speciﬁed parameter values,
we conduct sensitivity analysis to evaluate the robustness of our results to a range of key
parameter values. Here, we provide the rationale for the key speciﬁcations of the functional
forms and parameter values, with a full list of parameters and their values in Table 1.
Lake dynamics: We model the dynamics of lake water quality on a quarterly base.
Because the annual phosphorus loadings rate per acre is 0.13 in low-density residential areas
[34] and the average lot size of new one-family house sold in 2000 is roughly 0.41 acre
according to the U.S. Census, we set the quarterly loadings rate of residential land (l1) to be
0.013( 0:13=4  0:41). The steepness of the recycling curve r2 is assumed to be 8 which is
close to 7.88 reported in [8, p.762] and the average rate of phosphorus outﬂow (s) is assumed
to be 0.2 which is roughly a quarter of the mean annual rate of 0.817 in [8, p.762]. According
8Table 1: Parameter speciﬁcation.
Parameters Description Value
cx Consumption elasticity of the numeraire good 0.75
b0 Constant term in production externality 1.0
b1 Coeﬃcient of production externality 0.043
cc Coeﬃcient of disutility from congestion 0.003
ce Marginal disutility from ecological degradation 0.04
r0 Agricultural land rent 0.065
u0 Reservation utility 0.61
l0 Agricultural phosphorus loadings to lake 0.2
l1 Average phosphorus loadings from residential land use 0.013
s Average rate of phosphorus outﬂow 0.2
r1 Maximum rate of recycling 0.8
r2 Steepness of the recycling curve 8
pc phosphorus level at half the maximum rate of recycling 5
 Discount rate 0.01
1 Cost of economic intervention 100
2 Cost of ecological intervention 100
to [8, p.754], we set the spring P concentration at around 5% of the maximum concentration
attained the preceding summer, the maximum rate of recycling per quarter (r1) is around
0.8 in the baseline model. We set the half maximum rate of recycling (pc) to be 5.2
Production: We assume that the neoclassical production function for X exhibits con-
stant returns to scale: F(N) = N. The production externality term E(N) is a linear
approximation of the functional form suggested by empirical ﬁndings [17]3. In the baseline
model, a0  0:09 which corresponds to an approximately 6.5% increase in productivity when
2According to N¨ urnberg [27], the internal phosphorus loadings in the sampled stratiﬁed lakes range from
0 to 2100 mg m 2. We take the midpoint of the interval to be the maximum rate of recycling.
3Empirical studies typically assume an exponential form for the production externality: E(N) = Na0,
where a0 controls the increase in productivity [17]. These studies estimate a0 to vary in magnitude such
9population doubles.4
Utility: The ﬁrst term in the utility function speciﬁes the relative consumption trade-oﬀ
between land and numeraire consumption and is governed by the consumption elasticity
cx. Based on consumer expenditure reports on housing expenditures [7], we set set cx
to be 0.75, reﬂecting the fact that households spend about one quarter of their quarterly
income on housing and housing related services. We assume that the congestion eﬀect is
Uc(N) =  ccN2 and that the utility provided by the natural amenity service is of the
form Ue(P) =  ceP. The parameters cc and ce are the relative weighting coeﬃcients that
determine the respective contributions of congestions and ecological quality to utility. We
specify these parameter values so that the “push” and “pull” migration eﬀects that arise
from population and natural amenities are in balance when the regional economy is in or near
a steady state. We focus on population levels with an average steady state level of 75,000.5
Given a steady state of N  7:5 (since N is expressed in units of 10,000), we specify cc to
be relatively small (cc = 0:003), so that the incentive for out-migration due to congestion
is dominated by the incentive for in-migration due to agglomeration. We specify a higher
baseline value for the marginal disutility of ecological degradation (ce = 0:04), so that the
aggregate incentive for out-migration, due to either congestion or ecological degradation,
balances the incentive for in-migration. To examine the sensitivity of the model to our
speciﬁed baseline values, we conduct sensitivity analysis on the key parameters that govern
the push and pull migration eﬀects. The reservation utility u0 is speciﬁed so that signiﬁcant
changes in regional population occur relatively slowly, i.e. on the order of decades.
Income normalization: Wages are a function of the total population living in the region
as shown in Equation (2). Given the production function speciﬁed above, at an equilibrium
that a doubling of population generates a productivity increase that varies from about 3-10%. To simplify
the model, we use a linear function ˆ E(N) to approximate E(N) = Na0 for N 2 [0;8].
4In sensitivity analysis, we examine the impact of smaller production externality on our results.
5Based on descriptive analysis of US Census population data and county typology codes from the USDA
Economic Research Service, recreation-based counties in the top quartile of population had a mean popu-
lation of 71,567 in 2000 and an estimated population of 77,093 in 2007. Data http://www.ers.usda.gov/
Data/TypologyCodes/
10population level of N = 7:5, the relative household wage income is roughly W = 1:3.
According to the 2000 US Census, the median household income for homeowners is roughly
$12,750(= $51;000=4) per quarter, implying that expenditures on the numeraire good (which
are normalized to one) equal to $9,800( $12;750=1:3) in absolute terms. We use this to
determine an appropriate relative value of the housing rent r0. The average value per acre
cropland for U.S. in 2000 is $1,460[33]. The construction cost is set to be $96,200 calibrated
using the average construction cost per unit single family house in nonmetropolitan areas
in 2000.6 The total opportunity cost for the supply of residential land equals $87,660 (=
$1;460+$96;200). We then convert this opportunity cost into quarterly rent by continuous
compounding using the real thirty-year interest rate7. This results in a payment of $635
which makes r0  0:065 ( $635=$9;800).
With the assumed function forms of F(N), E(N), Uc(N) and Ue(P) mentioned above,
the household optimal consumption functions Xi and Li can be expressed as functions of
N and P. Substituting the optimal Xi and Li into equations (1) and (5) and rearranging
the terms will give us the following dynamic equations. To simplify the presentation in the
remainder of the paper, we relabel all the coeﬃcients in the ˙ N and ˙ P equations as ’s and
’s, respectively:8
˙ N = 1 + 2N + 3N
2 + 4P (6a)
˙ P = 1 + 2N + 3N
2 + 4P + 5
P 8
P 8 + p8
c
: (6b)
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of this coupled economic-ecological model for the base-
line case. The N-nullcline is the set of points that eliminates the utility diﬀerence between
the region and the rest of the world, that is f(N;P)j ˙ N = 0g. This allows us to interpret
6The data is obtained from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. To control for
the outliers, we exclude nonmetropolitan counties with per unit construction cost exceeding $250,000. This
excludes the top 1% of the observations.
7Calculated using the thirty-year nominal interest rate and the inﬂation rate in 2000 obtained from the
Federal Reserve website.
81 = ccx
x (1   cx)1 cxb0   u0, 2 = ccx
x (1   cx)1 cxb1r
cx 1
0 , 3 =  cc and 4 =  ce. 1 = l0, 2 =
l1(1   cx)b0=r0, 3 = l1(1   cx)b1=r0, 4 =  s and 5 = r1.
11the N-nullcline as the household indiﬀerence curve. Its hump-shape reﬂects the trade-oﬀ
between the household economic well-being and the desire for ecological services. When N
is small, the agglomerative forces dominate the congestion eﬀect and the expansion of the
regional population increases the welfare of all the households in the region. This increase in
household welfare needs to be oﬀset by an increase in phosphorus loading in order to remain
on the same indiﬀerence curve and thus, the slope of the N-nullcline is positive for smaller
values of N. When N is so high that the congestion eﬀect dominates, further expansion of
the regional population becomes a “bad.” A decrease in phosphorus loading is necessary to
make the household indiﬀerent. This makes the slope of the N-nullcline slope negative for
larger values of N. In states below (above) this N-nullcline, households will move into (out
of) the region, because of better (worse) ecological services.
The P-nullcline is similarly deﬁned. It is S-shaped because of the nonlinear dynamics
captured in the recycling term. The lower (upper) branch of the P-nullcline corresponds
to an oligotrophic (eutrophic) state of the lake. The curvature in the middle reﬂects the
nonlinear dynamics of the threshold eﬀect. In states to the right (left) of the P-nullcline,
phosphorus concentration will increase (decrease) because of the higher (lower) P-loadings
from economic activities in the region. The direction ﬁeld is plotted in Figure 1. The length
of the direction arrow is proportional to the velocity. In reality, an ecological regime shift
from an oligotrophic to eutrophic lake can occur in a couple of years. In contrast, the regional
migration is a much slower process which typically takes decades. Such a diﬀerence in the
speed of change in P and N is manifested by the long and upward pointing arrows when
N is large. Because households respond to severe ecological degradation changes through
out-migration, lake eutrophication is slowly reversible in this model. In the baseline case,
the recovery from eutrophication takes several decades.
The N- and P-nullclines intersect at the three ﬁxed-points: A, B and C. Point (A) is a
non-trivial stable ﬁxed point associated with a moderate population size and an oligotrophic
lake. Because population and ecology are “in balance” at this ﬁxed point, we refer to it as
the balanced economic-ecological equilibrium state. However, this point may be more or
less resilient to unexpected increases in phosphorus concentrations. An ecological shock
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Figure 1: Dynamics of the coupled economic-ecological system for the baseline model.
that increases phosphorus concentration (such as a variation in rain fall) or an economic
shock that increases land development (such as government policy that promotes economic
development) could trigger the recycling process and shift the lake from the oligotrophic to
eutrophic state. At ﬁxed point B, with insuﬃcient population to generate economic beneﬁts,
the pristine ecological services alone are unable to maintain local population. We refer to
this steady state as the “ecology-dominated” equilibrium state.9 Point (C) is an unstable
ﬁxed point. The thin solid line that passes through this point, called the separatrix, is the
stable manifold of the unstable ﬁxed point (C). That is, if the system starts from a point
on this line, it will eventually approach the unstable ﬁxed point. The separatrix partitions
the state space into two domains of attraction: that of the balanced equilibrium (A), which
is the area bounded by the separatrix, and that of the ecology-dominated equilibrium (B),
which is the remainder of the state space.
9In this model, we have not considered moving costs, irreversibility of development, household hetendo-
geneity or other realistic factors that would introduce frictions in household relocation and prevent a region
from emptying out. However, it is likely that the out-migration induced by ecological degradations may
move the regional economy to a much lower level of steady state economic activities.
134. Optimal Policy Analysis
In this section, we discuss the technical challenges involved in the dynamic optimization
of this integrated economic-ecological system with multiple equilibria and a non-convexity.
Because of the existence of multiple equilibria, the policy maker must decide when to drive
the system to one equilibrium versus the other. To consider the optimal policy problem, we
assume that a social planner will choose the policy that maximizes the net social beneﬁt,
deﬁned as the discounted utility of a representative household minus the per household cost
of the policy.10 The social planner has two policy instruments: one acts as a migration
incentive that aﬀects the local economy, denoted as v1(t); the other acts on phosphorus
loadings into the lake and aﬀects lake water quality, denoted as v2(t). These policies are
assumed to be continuous in their intensity and the cost of each is assumed to be increasing
in intensity. The optimization problem is formulated as:
max
{v1(t);v2(t)}
∫ ∞
0
e
−t
{
U
∗(N;P)   0:51v
2
1   0:52v
2
2)
}
dt (7a)
subject to
˙ N = 1 + 2N + 3N
2 + 4P + v1; (7b)
˙ P = 1 + 2N + 3N
2 + 4P + 5
P 8
P 8 + p8
c
  v2; (7c)
N(t)  0; P(t)  0; N(0) = N0; P(0) = P0: (7d)
10Following the suggestion of one referee, we tried using the aggregate individual utility, i.e. N(t)U(N;P;t)
as the welfare measure. However, this speciﬁcation increases nonlinearity in the Hamiltonian equations and
prevents us from deriving a solution using the continuation method [1]. For this reason, we assume that
social welfare is deﬁned in terms of a representative agent’s utility.
14Using the current value Hamiltonian, the optimality conditions of interior solutions are:
v1 = 1=3; v2 =  2=3; (8a)
˙ N = 1 + 2N + 3N
2 + 4P + v1; (8b)
˙ P = 1 + 2N + 3N
2 + 4P + 5
P 8
P 8 + p8
c
  v2; (8c)
˙ 1 = 1   1
[
2 + 23N
]
  2
[
2 + 23N
]
  2   23N; (8d)
˙ 2 = 2   14   2
[
4 + 5
8P 7p8
c (
P 8 + p8
c
)2
]
  4: (8e)
Along with the initial conditions (7d) and the transversality conditions:
0 = lim
T→+∞
e
−T1(T)N(T); and 0 = lim
T→+∞
e
−T2(T)P(T): (8f)
The policy-induced behavioral changes are embedded in this system of equations. A
policy that improves the lake quality will attract in-migration as shown in the fourth term in
Equation (8b). This increase in in-migration will then contribute more phosphorus loadings
through increased land use as shown in the second and third terms in Equation (8c). The
optimal policy considers this induced behavioral change as shown in the second term in
Equation (8e). When the ecological intervention reduces the phosphorus, the marginal
impact on the value function through this induced behavioral change equals the product of
the ecological impact on population (4) and the population shadow price (1).
With the presence of multiple equilibria, the policy maker needs to decide when to
intervene and drive the system to the balanced equilibrium (AIntg) which lies oﬀ the original
N- and P-nullclines, because v1 and v2 are non-zero at the steady state. Such a decision
depends on the relative location of the system to the policy intervention line, denoted in
Figure1 as the bold solid line in the upper left corner. If the system starts from a point on
this line, the optimal policy, as speciﬁed by Equations (8), that drives the system to AIntg,
generates the same social welfare as taking no action. To its right (left), the optimal policy
leading to the balanced equilibrium generates higher (lower) social welfare than taking no
15action. Because the transversality condition is automatically satisﬁed when N(T), P(T),
1(T) and 2(T) are ﬁnite as T ! +1, we use the population and phosphorus level at
AIntg as the boundary conditions for the diﬀerential equation system (8). For each initial
condition (N0;P0), we solve the corresponding boundary value problem and calculate the
present value of the net social beneﬁt, which is then compared with the social beneﬁt with
no intervention (v1(t)  0;v2(t)  0). If the two social beneﬁts equal, the initial condition
belongs to the policy intervention line.
The optimal policy eﬀectively enlarges the attraction domain of the balanced equilibrium.
As shown in Figure 1, many of the initial states that are outside the attraction domain of the
balanced equilibrium (A) as delineated by the separatrix are nonetheless to the right of the
policy intervention line. In the absence of any policy intervention, these initial states would
result in a long-lasting decline of the region that eventually would converge to the ecology-
dominating equilibrium. However, when considered from an optimal policy perspective, it
becomes socially desirable to invest in policy interventions that oﬀset this natural tendency
and instead drive the system towards the balanced equilibrium at AIntg.
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Figure 2: A comparison of the optimal policy in the integrated management model (v1 and v2) versus the
ecological management model (vEcol
2 ) for an initial condition (N0;P0) = (8;1).
Figure 2 shows the optimal policy for speciﬁc initial condition (N0;P0) = (8;1), which
corresponds to a case in which the coupled system is in danger of eutrophication due to
16overdevelopment. This ﬁgure demonstrates that policy interventions in the transient period
can be quite diﬀerent from those at the steady state.
Our results also suggest that for threshold management, the ending phase of a policy in
some cases can be crucially important for the ﬁnal outcome of the policy. In our simulation,
we ﬁnd that in some cases, for example when the cost of policy intervention is low, the
optimal policy can shift the balanced equilibrium across the separatrix into an otherwise
unsustainable state. A sudden stop of policy intervention will result in long lasting economic
decline because AIntg lies in the attraction domain of the ecology-dominated equilibrium B.
It is not uncommon that the ﬁnancial resources supporting a policy may run out, like the
budget cuts due to economically hard times. The results in this paper suggest that we should
not simply stop the funding, but rather put aside some resources and implement policies
that help to smooth the transition period when the policy fades out, either to mitigate the
transient ecological degradation or to bring the system from the new equilibrium AIntg back
into the attraction domain of the balanced equilibrium A.
5. A Comparison of Alternative Policies
In this section, we discuss the policy implications when overdevelopment in the region
may push the lake ecosystem across the ecological threshold. In particular, we ﬁrst discuss
the implications of the safe minimum standards (SMS) as proposed by Wantrup and Bishop
[11, 4]. Then we discuss the implications of a naive ecological management policy (e.g. as
in [5, 8]) in which the policy induced behavioral changes are not considered.
5.1. The Safe Minimum Standard
The SMS stipulates that as the ecosystem approaches an ecological threshold, concerns
for economic eﬃciency should be set aside and policy intervention should be implemented to
prevent the breach of the ecological threshold unless the cost of the policy becomes “intoler-
ably too burdensome” [4]. In this section, we illustrate how the performance of this policy
hinges upon the policy-induced behavioral changes and demonstrate how its implementation
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Figure 3: A SMS that limits P concentration in the lake and induces diﬀerent behavioral responses.
can endogenously make the cost of the policy “too burdensome.” In particular, the SMS is
not safe for local economies that are in an economic expansion phase.
Denote the SMS for phosphorus concentration as PSMS. If chosen correctly by the policy
maker, the value of PSMS will not exceed the ecological threshold, which is the level of P at
which the P-nullcline begins to bend back. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) illustrate this policy for
two respective cases. The ﬁrst case is when the agglomerative forces dominate congestion
in the regional economy, which corresponds to the range of N values that the N-nullcline
is increasing. We call this phase of development as the phase of economic expansion. The
second case is when the congestion eﬀects dominate, which corresponds to the range of N
values that the N-nullcline is decreasing. We call it the phase of post-economic-expansion
or simply the phase of post-expansion.
Because in reality the policy maker typically does not know the exact value of the thresh-
old, he may set PSMS more stringently below the true threshold level. This implies that the
phosphorus dynamics follow the natural dynamics only if P level is less than PSMS. When
the natural evolution of the system tries to drive P levels above PSMS, the SMS activates
and keeps the phosphorus P at the constant level of PSMS. Therefore, the actual P-nullcline
18under the SMS is the thick solid line in Figures 3(a) and 3(b), which creates a new steady
state ESMS. To see this, let us assume the system resides at the balanced equilibrium
(point A in Figure 3). The policy maker adopts the SMS which keeps P concentration at
or below PSMS. A small deviation, e.g., due to exogenous in-migration, will actually im-
prove economic welfare and induce more in-migration because the full negative ecological
impact is muted by the SMS. This in-migration will continue until the new steady state at
ESMS is reached. Thus, a SMS will lead to increased population and increased phosphorus
loadings that increase the costs of maintaining a SMS. The more stringent the SMS, the
larger the population at the steady state ESMS and the more severe the consequences of
overdevelopment if the SMS were removed.
Note that the implementation of the SMS results in a discrete change in the location
of what was the balanced equilibrium ﬁxed point: with a SMS in place, ESMS is no longer
in the attraction domain of the balanced equilibrium. Stated diﬀerently, the SMS fully
erodes the resilience of the balanced state by pushing it outside the attraction domain of
the balanced equilibrium and making it fully dependent on the successful enforcement of
the policy. If the SMS were eliminated or not properly maintained, a worse outcome may
result than had the SMS never been implemented. This is because, in the absence of a SMS,
the full ecological impacts of overdevelopment would be felt. Without any further policy
intervention, the system would be trapped in the ecology-dominated domain and the region
would experience a prolonged period of out-migration.
The SMS may work when the regional economy is in the phase of post-expansion as
shown in Figure 3(b). Assume the system is resting at the balanced equilibrium and is hit
by a sudden inﬂux of population that in the absence of any pollution control policy would
drive P above the ecological threshold. The implementation of SMS can successfully prevent
breaching the threshold. Meanwhile, because congestion is dominating, the inﬂux of people
will eventually leave the region and the system will recover to the balanced equilibrium. In
the transient period, SMS successfully avoids breaching the ecological threshold.
In summary, the performance of the SMS hinges on the dynamic responses of households
to the policy, which in turn depend on the relative balance between the agglomerative and
19dispersive forces that inﬂuence migration. In the ﬁrst example, the implementation of SMS
allows households to exploit the untapped development potential which would otherwise be-
ing deterred because of ecological degradation. This eventually makes the SMS too costly.
In the second example, SMS works eﬀectively. In the transient period, the SMS success-
fully avoids the breach of ecological threshold. Meanwhile, because the congestion eﬀect is
dominating, households gradually leave the region until the balanced equilibrium is restored.
5.2. Naive Ecological Management
In this section, we consider the management policy as discussed in many resource and
environmental analyses [5, 8]: policy makers respond to ecological degradation by reduc-
ing human impacts, but they do not consider the fact that the resulting improvements in
ecosystem services can generate feedbacks that inﬂuence the behavior of autonomous eco-
nomic agents. In other words, the problem is simpliﬁed to a one-way interaction in which
the policy maker is able to control human impacts directly by controlling pollution and does
not need to consider individual responses to the subsequent changes in ecosystem services.
For situations in which behavioral feedbacks do not exist, this set-up of the problem is ap-
propriate. However, when behavioral feedbacks exist, ignoring these eﬀects may result in
unintended consequences. In the context of our model, we consider this case by assuming
that the policy maker seeks only to control phosphorus loadings and ignores the indirect ef-
fect of this policy on households’ behavior to an improvement in ecosystem amenities. This
leads to the following optimization problem:
max
{vEcol
2 (t)}
∫ ∞
0
e
−t
{
1 + 2N + 3N
2 + 4P   0:52
[
v
Ecol
2 (t)
]2
}
dt (9a)
subject to
˙ P = 1 + 2N + 3N
2 + 4P + 5
P 8
P 8 + p8
c
  v
Ecol
2 (t) (9b)
20where vEcol
2 (t) is the policy instrument with an increasing marginal cost. The current value
Hamiltonian gives the following optimality condition:
˙ P = 1 + 2N + 3N
2 + 4P + 5
P 8
P 8 + p8
c
+ 
Ecol
2 =3 (10a)
˙ 
Ecol
2 = 
Ecol
2   
Ecol
2
[
4 + 5
8P 7p8
c (
P 8 + p8
c
)2
]
+ 24 (10b)
The optimal intervention vEcol
2 =  Ecol
2 =3 is plotted as the solid line in Figure 2.
Policies that ignore the behavioral responses when in fact these responses to policy are
present are clearly suboptimal. Comparing Equations (10) with Equations (8a), (8c) and
(8e), they diﬀer only by the term (14) in Equation (8e) which captures the indirect policy
eﬀect on household behavior. This diﬀerence is most signiﬁcant if the marginal utility of
ecosystem amenities (4) is high and local economic development is a major concern, or in
other words, the shadow price of development (1) is high. Both conditions are satisﬁed by
small communities experiencing amenity-led growth and rural communities attempting to
restructure their traditional resource extractive industries into a more service-based economy.
It is easy to prove that at the steady state, Ceteris Paribus, if vEcol
2 > 0 as t ! +1 and if
the shadow price for regional development is positive (1 > 0), a failure to account for these
behavioral responses will result in an underestimate of the shadow price for phosphorus
(2) at the steady state. Consequently, the ecological intervention will be insuﬃcient and
eutrophication is more likely to occur.
The potential failure of a naive ecological management approach when behavioral re-
sponses are present is illustrated in Figure 4. Let us consider the baseline case that overde-
velopment puts the lake in the danger of eutrophication in the absence of any policy in-
tervention. If the policy maker does not consider the behavioral responses to a pollution
control policy, he will expect that population will be ﬁxed at the current level N0 and that
the ecological system will evolve along the solid line passing through N0 in Figure 4(a) and
end up in the eutrophic state at an imaginary steady state AImag. Because the excessive
phosphorus loadings are the key driver behind eutrophication, he will implement a policy to
reduce phosphorus loadings, which will shift the P-nullcline to the right. Given the optimal
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Figure 4: Comparison of a naive ecosystem management (Equation 10) versus integrated ecosys-
tem approach (Equation 6). Figure(a) The policy maker’s perceived ecological-economic dynamics
before a policy intervention occurs: the policy maker with a naive view of the system believes that
population is ﬁxed at N0. Figure(b) The policy maker’s perceived ecological-economic dynamics
after a naive policy intervention occurs: the policy maker believes that he has optimally controlled
the impact of P in the absence of any behavioral response. Figure(c) The actual ecological-economic
dynamics after a naive policy intervention has occurred and a behavioral response is present: the
policy maker fails to account for the behavioral response, which results in overdevelopment and
ecological decline. Figure(d) The actual ecological-economic dynamics after the optimal policy
intervention occurs in which the behavioral response is accounted for using the integrated model.
22policy in the naive ecological management problem as speciﬁed in Equations (10), the pol-
icy maker believes that with this naive optimal policy in place, the system will evolve along
the solid line in Figure4(b) and end up at equilibrium AEcol. While lake eutrophication is
avoided, as AEcol locates on the lower branch of the P-nullcline, the phosphorus level at
AEcol increases and is even closer to the eutrophication threshold as compared to the origi-
nal balanced equilibrium at A. This is because policies that reduce the phosphorus loadings
in eﬀect enhance the carrying capacity of the lake so that it is able to accommodate more
economic activities and higher phosphorus loadings.
When such a policy is implemented in the coupled economic-ecological system described
in (6) in which behavioral feedbacks are present, the policy-induced behavioral changes
can generate unintended consequences as shown in Figure4(c). Because the starting point
(N0;P0) is below the N-nullcline, people will migrate into the region even without any policy
intervention. An exclusive policy focusing on controlling pollution will improve the water
quality and make the region more attractive. This will worsen the overdevelopment problem
and result in increased ecological degradation, as illustrated by the initial increase in P
in Figure4(c). In spite of the policy intervention, lake eutrophication occurs, the economy
declines and it takes decades to recover to the original balanced equilibrium.
The necessity of the integrated approach is illustrated by the comparison between Fig-
ure4(c) and 4(d). Through the coordination of the ecological and economic policies, the
policy from the integrated approach addresses the policy-induced behavioral changes, miti-
gates the ecological degradation and avoids the associated long-lasting economic decline.
6. Sensitivity Analysis
Given our focus on the two-way economic-ecological interactions between urban growth
and water quality, our results are potentially most sensitive to the speciﬁcation of these
interaction terms, i.e., the individual disutility from ecological degradation (the P term in
the ˙ N equation) and the impact of the regional economy on the lake’s ecology (the N terms
in the ˙ P equation). We explore the sensitivity of the optimal policy results to several key
parameter values that govern the strength of these interaction terms.
23First, we consider the baseline value of ce, the coeﬃcient that determine the households’
relative disutility from ecological degradation, which is speciﬁed as 0.04. Sensitivity analysis
shows that the optimal policies are robust for ce > 0:024. We experiment by allowing
ce to range over the interval [0.024, 0.08]11 and ﬁnd similar results to the baseline case.
Moreover, the topological structure of the system dynamics remains the same as the baseline.
Speciﬁcally, both the balanced and ecology-dominating equilibria are stable, as they are in
the baseline case. As ce become larger, the disutility from ecological degradation becomes
stronger and the economic beneﬁts from agglomeration become insuﬃcient to sustain the
balanced equilibrium without a policy intervention. Technically, the N-nullcline falls below
the P-nullcline and no longer intersects at the balanced equilibrium A as in Figure 1. In such
a case, the optimal policy would create a balanced equilibrium (AIntg) and sustain the system
at this equilibrium state when the system lies to the right of the policy intervention line. On
the other hand, as ce becomes smaller, people will tolerate greater ecological degradation.
Without any policy intervention, this can make the balanced equilibrium unstable. In this
case, the optimal policy has an additional objective, which is to eliminate or mitigate the
boom-and-bust cycles that otherwise would result when ce is very low.
Second, we consider the sensitivity of the results to our speciﬁcation of l1, the coeﬃcient
controlling the impact of urbanization on the lake ecology. We ﬁnd analogous results. With
a baseline value of l1 = 0:013, we vary its value in the range of [0:005;0:024]. We ﬁnd that the
basic topological structure, i.e., the bistability of both the balanced and ecology-dominated
equilibria remains unchanged. As l1 increases, the P-nullcline shifts upward because the
ecological impact of urbanization at any population level increases. Because the ecological
system becomes more sensitive to regional growth, the carrying capacity is reduced, as is
the equilibrium population level associated with the balanced equilibrium. Ceteris Paribus,
as l1 increases further ( 0:025), the ecological degradation associated with the economic
growth becomes so strong that the balanced equilibrium can no longer be sustained.
11When ce = 0:08, the out-migration incentive due to ecological degradation alone is strong enough to
balance the in-migration incentive due to agglomeration given an equilibrium population of N = 7:5. When
ce = 0:024, the out-migration incentive is about half of the baseline case.
24Thirdly, we explore the sensitivity of our results to the parameters that govern population
dynamics. Recall that the quadratic form of population growth as a function of population
level is speciﬁed to capture the agglomeration and congestion eﬀects that are reported in the
empirical literature on regional growth. Accordingly, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on
the agglomeration coeﬃcient b1. When b1 2 [0:015; 0:05], which roughly corresponds to the
empirically estimated range of 3.1-10% increase in productivity when population doubles12,
the optimal policy is qualitatively similar to the baseline case.
As for the marginal cost of residential land provision (r0), we change its value in the
range of [0:015;0:15].13 A decrease in r0 has both an income and substitution eﬀect that
increases the household’s land consumption. Consequently, the N-nullcline is shifted upward
since the income eﬀect allows people to tolerate more pollution. The P-nullcline is shifted
upward because the substitution eﬀect pushes up the demand for land at any population
level. The optimal solution is similar to the baseline with a shifted equilibrium state. So far,
we have implicitly assumed that the construction of housing units is perfectly competitive.
This implies that the unit construction cost is a constant. Alternatively, we may assume
that the supply of housing units is not perfectly competitive and that local labor is used
in housing construction. This will make the construction cost and r0 endogenous to the
regional development. It will also increase the demand for local labor. Intuitively, this
increase in demand will increase household income in the region and enhance the incentive
for in-migration. However, the increase in the labor demand will also push up the land rent r0
and the cost of living, which will mitigate the incentive for in-migration. As for the demand
for residential land, the income eﬀect will increase the demand while the substitution eﬀect
will decrease it. To fully incorporate this endogeneity, the model has to be modiﬁed so
that wage rate depends on the local demand of both the numeraire good and the housing
production. In addition, local labor needs to be eﬃciently allocated between the production
12For the case of 3%, the agglomeration force is too weak to oﬀset the ecological degradation and support
the local economy.
13If we double (halve) either the construction cost or the interest rate used to calculate r0, the corre-
sponding value of r0 lies in this range.
25of the numeraire good and housing construction. These changes are technically involving
and distract the attention from our focus on threshold management. While we have not
fully incorporate this endogeneity, the impact can be partially observed through the above
sensitivity analysis. If endogenous construction cost enhances/mitigates the in-migration
incentive, the eﬀect on regional development can be learned by increases/decreases in the
parameter (b1), which controls the strength of agglomeration forces. After considering both
the income and substitution eﬀects, if endogenous construction cost increases/decreases the
ﬁnal demand for residential land, the ecological impact is similar to an increase/decrease in
l1 which controls the ecological impact of regional economic activities at the given population
level.
Finally, we double the intervention cost for both policy instruments (1 and 2) and
change the relative weights between the economic and ecological interventions from 1 : 1 to
1 : 3 and 3 : 1. We only ﬁnd quantitative changes in the optimal solutions, but no qualitative
diﬀerences.
In short, the optimal policy results that we derive in the preceding section for this
integrated economic-ecological system are robust to the speciﬁcation of key parameter values,
as is the basic bi-stable structure of the ecological-economic system. While the exact location
of the optimal policy intervention line depends on the parameter speciﬁcation, the existence
of this line is robust to the range of parameter values explored above. This implies that for
integrated economic-ecological systems such as this one, there exists a set of initial conditions
that in the absence of policy would not evolve to a balanced equilibrium, but for which it is
optimal to intervene with policies that guide the system to an equilibrium in which regional
population and ecological degradation are in balance.
7. Conclusion
This study investigates threshold management in a dynamically interacting economic-
ecological system in which the ecosystem responds to the cumulative impacts of individuals
and individuals’ respond to subsequent changes in the ecosystem due to amenity-led mi-
gration. While economic models of optimal ecosystem management have long accounted
26for the direct eﬀects of pollution policies on improvements to ecosystem services, relatively
few have accounted for the indirect eﬀects of these policies that arise if individuals respond
to these ecological improvements. The optimal management of such a system rests on the
consideration of both these direct and indirect eﬀects. Here we consider the case in which
policies improve the ecological condition of regions experiencing amenity-led migration, but
in doing so also attract additional growth that exacerbates ecological degradation. We ﬁnd
a policy intervention line in this non-convex economic-ecological model which shows that the
optimal policy eﬀectively enlarges the attraction domain of the balanced equilibrium. For a
range of initial conditions, it is optimal to intervene with policies that can push the system
into the attraction domain of the balanced equilibrium in which balanced levels of regional
population and ecosystem services are both sustained. We show that policies such as a safe
minimum standard or a strict pollution control, which seek only to improve ecological con-
ditions and ignore the indirect eﬀects of these policies on regional migration responses, can
exacerbate boom-bust cycles or drive the system to long-run ecological degradation and eco-
nomic decline. We ﬁnd that these outcomes depend critically on the state of the system when
the policy is implemented. For example, when regional growth reaches the post-expansion
stage in which congestion eﬀects dominate agglomeration forces, a safe minimum standard
policy can work as intended. However, when the regional economy is expanding and ag-
glomeration forces dominate congestion eﬀects, this policy can have the opposite eﬀect by
attracting more economic activities into the region and resulting in much greater ecological
degradation. We ﬁnd similar results for policies that seek to control pollution, but that fail
to account for the indirect policy eﬀects that arise from households’ behavioral responses to
the improvements in ecosystem amenities. When behavioral feedbacks are present, optimal
ecosystem management relies on taking an integrated modeling approach that incorporates
the dynamics of both the ecology and human behavior and the responses of each to the
other.
Such an integrated modeling approach is technically challenging due to non-convexities
that are characteristic of both regional economic growth and the dynamics of ecosystems
subject to thresholds. Under these conditions, multiple equilibria are very likely, imply-
27ing that the optimal policy cannot always be identiﬁed using analytical methods, as Brock
and Starrett ([5]) and others [24, 35] have emphasized. Our results demonstrate that ob-
taining optimal policy prescriptions for non-convex systems is technically challenging and
information-intensive, but possible. This approach also underscores the messiness of complex
economic-ecological systems in which multiple equilibria are likely. Despite these challenges
and the need for simulation methods to derive model results, we are able to obtain optimal
policy results that are robust to a range of plausible parameter values.
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